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ETHICS YEAR IN REVIEW
James T. Erickson*
I. INTRODUCTION
If ignorance of the law is no excuse, it is especially inex-
cusable for attorneys to be ignorant of the law governing their
profession. As suggested by soaring malpractice insurance
rates,' such ignorance can be costly. More fundamentally,
however, the "law of lawyering" plays an essential role in
maintaining the high ethical standards incumbent upon the
sole profession allowed access to the judicial system. While it
is obviously important to every attorney to avoid litigation as
a defendant in civil suits, of even greater importance is the
need to assimilate the relevant law as a guide to proper ethi-
cal choices in complex circumstances. No one's intuitive
sense of right and wrong is sufficiently comprehensive to pro-
vide the correct, spontaneous "reading" of every professional
situation. By the same token, though, it is difficult to stay
apprized of an area of law subject to such variation not only
from state to state,2 but also with respect to general guides
such as the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers and
the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.
This article will review the most significant ethical devel-
opments of 2003, primarily but not exclusively in regard to
legal ethics in California. Part II of this article describes the
background and results of a five-year re-evaluation of the
* Book Review and Ethics Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 44.
J.D. candidate, Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., Hampshire College.
1. See, e.g., Jeanne Greeley, Thoubled By the Rising Cost of Malpractice
Insurance?, MASS. LAWYERS WKLY., Feb. 2, 2004.
2. See, e.g., Thomas E. Spahn, Sarbanes-Oxley and "Whistleblowing" by
Corporate Lawyers-The Untold Story, CORP. COUNS. MAG. (Mar. 2003), at
http://library.lp.findlaw.com/articles/file/00037/008728 (describing "the dizzying
variation among state ethics rules").
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rules applicable in California to multijurisdictional practice.3
Part III provides summaries of the four most recent formal
opinions of the California State Bar's Standing Committee on
Professional Responsibility and Conduct.4 Finally, Part IV
describes two somewhat controversial amendments to the
ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, both of which re-
define lawyer-client confidentiality in an era marked by cor-
porate scandals.5
II. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE RULES OF
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
Recently, the topic of multijurisdictional practice has
come to the forefront in debates over the future of the legal
profession.6 Attorneys frequently cross state lines to attend to
their clients' concerns, and often do so "virtually" as the re-
sult of "the advent of technological change, the Internet, and
rapid growth of interstate and multinational commerce" in an
"increasingly global economy."7 The American Bar Associa-
tion has hosted a forum on multijurisdictional practice and
formed a commission to consider it, while various state bars
(including California's) "have established committees, task
forces, and advisory groups to study the issue."8 At least in
California, such efforts are likely to produce significant
changes in the near future, particularly in regard to revisions
of the California Rules of Court.
A. Background. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v.
Superior Court9
The turning point in the movement toward the proposed
revisions came with the California Supreme Court's decision
in Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Superior
Court.° One legal publication described Birbrower as an "al-
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See CAL. SUP. CT. ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
PRACTICE, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (2002) [hereinafter TASK
FORCE], available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/comm2-csca.pdf.
7. Kristina Horton Flaherty, Panel Urges Relaxing Practice Limits for Out-
of-State Lawyers, CAL. B.J., Aug. 2003, at ABA 1.
8. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 5 n.1.
9. 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998).
10. Id.; see also Flaherty, supra note 7, at ABA 3.
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ready unusual case [that] took an even more unusual turn.""
California attorney Scott Mosko, who represented Birbrower
before the high court, later suggested that "[t]he maxim 'bad
facts make bad law' probably applies to this case."'
Birbrower, a New York law firm representing a New
York client, negotiated a license with California-based Tan-
dem Computers."3 Birbrower's New York client then created
ESQ, a California company, to manage the work generated by
the license.14 When a dispute arose with Tandem, Birbrower
sent two attorneys to California to advise ESQ and negotiate
with Tandem." Eventually the two sides reached an agree-
ment.16
ESQ, however, later sued Birbrower for malpractice."
Birbrower then cross-complained for lack of payment. The
"even more unusual turn" in this unusual case was ESQ's re-
sponse to Birbrower's cross-complaint: Because Birbrower's
attorneys were not licensed to practice in California, ESQ ar-
gued, Birbrower was barred from recovering compensation.' 9
The Santa Clara District Court granted summary judgment
in favor of ESQ (the case's real party in interest), and the
court of appeal affirmed."
In affirming in part the lower courts' decisions, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court agreed that Birbrower had violated
section 6125 of the State Bar Act, which prohibits the unau-
thorized practice of law in California.2' With certain excep-
tions, "no one but an active member of the State Bar may
practice law for another person in California."
2
1
In defining "the practice of law 'in California,"' the court
specified "sufficient contact with the California client to ren-
11. See Flaherty, supra note 7, at ABA 3.
12. Id.
13. Birbrower, 949 P.2d 1 at 3.
14. See Flaherty, supra note 7, at ABA 3. ESQ was also the name of the
New York client, incorporated separately from the California-based "ESQ." See
Jack Balderson, Jr., Note, Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, PC. v. Su-
perior Court, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 871, 874-75 (1999).
15. See Birbrower, 949 P.2d 1 at 3.
16. Seeid.
17. Seeid. at 4.
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 7; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6125 (West 2004).
22. Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 5.
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der the nature of the legal services a clear legal representa-
tion." Notably (although not pertinent to the facts in Bir-
brower), the phrase "in California" does not necessarily imply
physical presence in the state: "The primary inquiry is
whether the unlicensed lawyer engaged in sufficient activities
in the state, or created a continuing relationship with the
California client that included legal duties and obligations.","
Most crucially, Birbrower had argued that section 6125
should allow for an exception "for work incidental to private
arbitration or other alternative dispute resolution proceed-
ings., 2' Alternatively, Birbrower argued for an ad hoc excep-
tion based on the fact that "[m]ultistate relationships are a
common part of today's society and are to be dealt with in
common sense fashion. In many situations, strict adherence
to rules prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law by out-
of-state attorneys would be 'grossly impractical and ineffi-
cient."'26
The court's response foreshadowed the subsequent pro-
posal of new rules of multijurisdictional practice: "[A] decision
to except out-of-state attorneys ... from section 6125 is more
appropriately left to the California legislature," the body that
"has the authority to determine qualifications for admission
to the State Bar and to decide what constitutes the practice of
law.
, 27
B. Initial Response to Birbrower: The Report of the Task
Force on Multjurisdictional Practice
In the wake of Birbrower, the legislature requested the
California Supreme Court to assemble a task force to "[s]tudy
and make recommendations regarding whether and under
what circumstances, attorneys who are licensed to practice
law in other states and who have not passed the California
State Bar examination may be permitted to practice law in
California."" As assembled, the Task Force on Multijurisdic-
tional Practice ("Task Force") comprised "civil and criminal
litigators, private and public attorneys, lawyers and layper-
23. Id.
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 8.
26. Id. at 10 (quoting In reEstate of Waring, 221 A.2d 193, 197 (N.J. 1966)).
27. See id. at 8-9.
28. S.B. 1782 (Cal. 2000).
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sons, and transactional and trial counsel."29 After meeting "as
a whole on six occasions," and soliciting and considering pub-
lic commentary on its Preliminary Report and Recommenda-
tions," the Task Force released its Final Report and Recom-
mendations on January 7, 2002-four years to the week after
the Birbrower decision, which the Report pointedly cites sev-
eral times.3
1. Recommendations in Favor of Revision
The Task Force recommended liberalizing the rules of
multijurisdictional practice in regard to four categories of
practice:
(a) in-house counsel residing in California;32
(b) public-interest attorneys relocating to California;33
(c) nonlitigating lawyers temporarily in California to pro-
vide legal services;" and
(d) lawyers temporarily in California as part of litiga-
tion.35
Attorneys in the first two categories would be allowed to
practice through a system of registration, a "process similar
to admission to the [Bar], but without requiring an attorney
to pass the California bar examination." 6  Registration re-
quirements would include, for example, agreeing to "abide by
the rules that govern members of the State Bar, and submit
to discipline by the State Bar," as well as to "participat[e] in
mandatory continuing legal education."37
Attorneys in the latter two categories would qualify via a
change in the definition of "the unauthorized practice of
law"-a "safe harbor" approach by which the attorneys would
be allowed to "undertake specified tasks."3" While also being
obliged to submit to discipline by the State Bar, however,
they would not be required to participate in mandatory con-
29. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 9.
30. See id. at 10.
31. See, e.g., id. at 14-15.
32. Id. at 27.
33. Id. at 30.
34. Id. at 32.
35. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 37.
36. Id. at 7.
37. Id. at 27.
38. Id. at 37-38.
2004 1313
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
tinuing legal education.3 9
2. Recommendations Against Revision
The Task Force recommended against changing the rules
in regard to two categories: (a) experienced attorneys moving
to California from other states;40 and (b) government lawyers
located in California.4
Perhaps as important, the Task Force considered at
length but rejected adopting a system of reciprocity.42 Recip-
rocity would permit "lawyers licensed to practice law in other
states ... to practice law in California, provided those states
confer a similar right on California lawyers."' 3 The Task
Force pointed out that California permits graduates of unac-
credited law schools to join the bar; if such attorneys were not
permitted to practice in reciprocal states, not only would a
two-tier "class" system be imposed on California attorneys,4
but the distinction would "have an adverse effect on law
schools that the ABA has not approved.,
45
With less discussion of the issue, the Task Force also re-
jected adopting a system of comity, which would allow attor-
neys licensed in any other state to practice in California.46 In
effect, comity would lower the standards of admission to Cali-
fornia legal practice to the lowest level acceptable in any
other state, a result the Task Force found inconsistent with
the goal of protecting consumers of legal services.
39. See id. at 24, 32.
40. Id. at 39.
41. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, 11.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. See id. The report does not explicitly use a phrase such as "two-tier,"
but the implication is clear. See Mike McKee, California Rules May Ease for
Out-of-State Lawyers, RECORDER (N. Cal.), May 14, 2003, at
http://www.acca.com/practice/mjp/ca-rules.php (quoting law professor Gerald
Uelman in regard to the danger of "creat[ing] two classes of California law-
yers").
45. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 19.
46. See id. at 23.
47. See id. The Report also states the concern that "lawyers would lose sub-
stantial connection to the geographic community in which they practice," id. at
5, which "could make it difficult to protect consumers of legal services and could
degrade professionalism." Id. at 6.
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C. The Work of the Multijurisdictional Practice
Implementation Committee: Proposed Rules of Court 964,
965, 966, and 967
In response to the Task Force's recommendation that a
new committee be formed to "address issues related to the
implementation of any of the task force's proposals,"4 the
California Supreme Court appointed the Multijurisdictional
Practice Implementation Committee ("MPIC").49 On May 12,
2003, the MPIC released "Multijurisdictional Practice of Law
by Lawyers Not Admitted to the State Bar of California," a
preliminary report intended to stimulate public comment."
The Supreme Court invited "state, local, and specialty bar as-
sociations, judges, consumer groups, legislators, and other in-
terested groups and individuals" to submit responses to the
report by July 7, 2003."'
In essence, the MPIC codified as formal rules the Task
Force's plain-language recommendations.52  However, the
MPIC "[went] further than the task force with its recommen-
dation to allow attorneys to practice temporarily on specific
matters.""3
1. Proposed Rule of Court 964: Registered Public
Interest Attorneys
Proposed Rule 964 would allow registered out-of-state at-
torneys to practice law for up to three years at "public inter-
est organizations" if supervised by a member of the State
Bar.54 As summarized by the MPIC's report, the rule defines
such organizations as "nonprofit entities whose primary pur-
48. See id. at 41.
49. See CAL. SUP. CT. MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE IMPLEMENTATION
COMM., MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW BY LAWYERS NOT ADMITTED
TO THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, at 1 (2003) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY
REPORT], at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/invitationstocommentjdocuments/sp03-
04.pdf.
50. See Press Release, Judicial Council of Cal., Supreme Court Committee
Seeks Comment on Proposed Rules for Out-of-State Lawyers (May 12, 2003), at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/presscenter/newsreleases/NR32-03.HTM.
51. Id.
52. See McKee, supra note 44.
53. Id.
54. See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 49, at Proposed Rule 964 (to be
codified at CAL. R. CT. 964) (addressing work in California by registered public
interest attorneys).
2004 1315
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
pose is to provide legal services without charge to indigent
persons.""5
2. Proposed Rule of Court 965. Registered In-House
Counsel
Although not permitted to appear in court, registered in-
house counsel licensed in other states would be allowed by
Rule 965 to provide legal services to their employers." The
permission would extend only to California residents whose
employer either (a) employs in California an active member of
the California Bar, or (b) employs ten or more full-time em-
ployees in California.57 The employer must also be a "legal
entity" classifiable within a broad range of "qualified institu-
tions.""8
3. Proposed Rule of Court 966." Lawyers Practicing Law
Temporarily in California as Part of Litigation
Under four circumstances, Rule 966 would allow an un-
registered out-of-state attorney to practice law in California
on a temporary and occasional basis. 5 The attorney must ei-
ther (1) be authorized to appear in a legal proceeding occur-
ring in another jurisdiction; (2) expect to be so authorized if
the proceeding is merely anticipated; (3) expect to be so au-
thorized in an anticipated legal proceeding in California; or
(4) be supervised by an attorney who falls into one of the
other three categories. °
4. Proposed Rule of Court 967 Non-Litigating Lawyers
Temporarily in California to Provide Legal Services
Under three circumstances, Rule 967 would allow an un-
registered out-of-state attorney to provide legal assistance in
55. See id at 2.
56. See id. at Proposed Rule 965 (to be codified at CAL. R. CT. 965) (address-
ing work in California by registered in-house counsel).
57. See id.
58. See id. "'Qualifying institution' means a corporation, a partnership, an
association, or other legal entity, including its subsidiaries and organizational
affiliates." Id.
59. See id. at Proposed Rule 966 (to be codified at CAL. R. CT. 966) (address-
ing work by lawyers practicing law temporarily in California as part of litiga-
tion).
60. See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 49, at Proposed Rule 966.
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California on a temporary and occasional basis."' The legal
assistance must involve either (1) a transaction or other
nonlitigation matter substantially taking place wherever the
attorney is licensed; (2) an issue of federal law or the law of
another jurisdiction being handled by California attorneys; or
(3) the needs of an employer-client or its subsidiaries or or-
ganizational affiliates. 2
III. FORMAL OPINIONS OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CONDUCT OF THE STATE
BAR OF CALIFORNIA
From time to time, the Standing Committee on Profes-
sional Responsibility and Conduct of the State Bar of Califor-
nia ("Committee") issues advisory opinions in response to
queries from members of the State Bar or on its own initia-
tive.62 Limited to questions of professional responsibility and
ethics, these opinions are non-binding.6' In 2003, the Com-
mittee issued four opinions.6
A. The Duty of Confidentiality in the Context of Informal
Requests for Legal Advice: Formal Opinion 2003-1616
Most attorneys have received casual requests for legal
advice from strangers, acquaintances, and family members.
Often such requests come too quickly or unexpectedly for an
attorney to discourage the speaker from revealing confiden-
tial information. In considering whether and when the duty
of confidentiality arises in such situations, the Committee
discussed three hypothetical scenarios.67
61. See id. at Proposed Rule 967 (to be codified at CAL. R. CT. 967) (address-
ing non-litigation work by lawyers practicing law temporarily in California).
62. See id.
63. See State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Profl Responsibility & Con-
duct, Rules §§ 1, 6, at
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbargeneric.jsp?slmagePath=Rules.gif
&sCategoryPath=/Home/Attorney%20Resources/Ethics%2OInformation/Commnit
tee%20for%2OProfessional%2OResponsibility%20%26%2OConduct&sHeading=R
ules&sFileType=HTML&sCatHtmlPath=html/COPRACRules.html.
64. Seeid.§7.
65. See infra Part III.A.-D.
66. State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Profl Responsibility & Conduct,
Formal Op. 2003-161 (2003) [hereinafter Formal Op. 2003-161], at
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/ethics/OPN-2003-161.pdf.
67. Seeid. at 2.
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1. Hypothetical Facts&'
Situation 1: Jones spots Lawyer in the courthouse and
asks whether she is an attorney. Lawyer responds, "Yes."
Jones, a complete stranger, immediately confesses that he
alone committed a burglary for which he and Doe have been
charged. Jones asks Lawyer for advice. Lawyer suggests
contacting the public defender's office. Later, Doe seeks to
hire Lawyer to defend him against the burglary charges.
Situation 2: At a party, Smith learns vaguely that Law-
yer is an attorney, with no reference to her area of practice.
During a casual conversation, Smith briefly describes prob-
lems he is having with his insurer, who refuses to pay for re-
placement of his office's badly leaking roof. Without identify-
ing the insurer, he asks for advice. Lawyer politely refrains
from interrupting Smith's brief statement, but then immedi-
ately says she is not in a position to advise Smith about the
situation. Later, Smith's insurer-one of Lawyer's clients-
assigns Lawyer the defense of Smith's claim.
Situation 3: Aware that Lawyer handles wills and es-
tates, Lawyer's Cousin calls Lawyer at home. Cousin ex-
plains that he borrowed their late grandmother's uninsured
car and "wrecked" it. He asks whether this will cause prob-
lems when her estate is resolved, and whether he should do
anything. Lawyer refrains from interrupting Cousin, but
then suggests he call a lawyer referral service. Later, Law-
yer's family hires her to probate her grandmother's estate and
obtain compensation for the damaged car.
2. Discussion
A two-part analysis is required to determine whether any
of the three situations creates a duty of confidentiality.69
First, the duty arises upon the formation of an express or im-
plied-in-fact attorney-client relationship."0 Second, absent
such a relationship, the duty arises if Lawyer has "manifested
a willingness to engage in preliminary consultation" in order
to provide legal advice or services." In the latter case, how-
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 2-3 (citing State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Prof1
Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 1984-84 (1984) [hereinafter Formal Op.
1984-84]).
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ever, the duty arises only if the communication is, in fact, con-
fidential; for example (with some exceptions), no duty exists if
the information is publicly known, or if the speaker transmits
it to third parties. 72
72. See Formal Op. 2003-161, supra note 66 (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 6068(e) (West 2003); CAL. EVID. CODE § 951, 952, 954 (West 2003); CAL.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-310(E) (2000)).
The relevant part of California Business and Professions Code section
6068(e) states that it is the duty of an attorney to "maintain inviolate the confi-
dence, and at every peril to himself or herself, to preserve the secrets, of his or
her client." CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e).
California Evidence Code section 951 states: "As used in this article, 'cli-
ent' means a person who ... consults a lawyer for the purpose of retaining the
lawyer or securing legal service or advice from him in his professional capac-
ity .... " CAL. EVID. CODE § 951.
California Evidence Code section 952 states:
As used in this article, "confidential communication between client and
lawyer" means information transmitted between a client and his or her
lawyer in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means
which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no
third persons other than those who are present to further the interest
of the client in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasona-
bly necessary for the transmission of the information or the accom-
plishment of the purpose for which the lawyer is consulted, and in-
cludes a legal opinion formed and the advice given by the lawyer in the
course of that relationship.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 952.
The relevant part of California Evidence Code section 954 states:
[T]he client, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to dis-
close, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communi-
cation between client and lawyer if the privilege is claimed by:
(a) The holder of the privilege;
(b) A person who is authorized to claim the privilege by the holder of
the privilege; or
(c) The person who was the lawyer at the time of the confidential com-
munication, but such person may not claim the privilege if there is no
holder of the privilege in existence or if he is otherwise instructed by a
person authorized to permit disclosure.
Cal. R. Evid. 954.
Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct is mentioned
at several points in this article. For the sake of reference, the complete text
states:
(A) For purposes of this rule:
(1) "Disclosure" means informing the client or former client of the rele-
vant circumstances of the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse
consequences to the client or former client;
(2) "Informed written consent" means the client's or former client's
written agreement to representation following written disclosure;
(3) "Written" means any writing as defined in Evidence Code section
250.
(B) A member shall not accept or continue representation of a client
without providing written disclosure to the client where:
1320 SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW Vol: 44
a. Whether an Attorney-Client Relationship Exists
In none of the situations did Lawyer expressly assent to
represent the speaker.73 However, an implied-in-fact agree-
ment between the parties may exist depending on the parties'
(1) The member has a legal, business, financial, professional, or per-
sonal relationship with a party or witness in the same matter; or
(2) The member knows or reasonably should know that:
(a) the member previously had a legal, business, financial, professional,
or personal relationship with a party or witness in the same matter;
and
(b) the previous relationship would substantially affect the member's
representation; or
(3) The member has or had a legal, business, financial, professional, or
personal relationship with another person or entity the member knows
or reasonably should know would be affected substantially by resolu-
tion of the matter or
(4) The member has or had a legal, business, financial, or professional
interest in the subject matter of the representation.
(C) A member shall not, without the informed written consent of each
client:
(1) Accept representation of more than one client in a matter in which
the interest of the clients potentially conflict; or
(2) Accept or continue representation of more than one client in a mat-
ter in which the interests of the clients actually conflict; or
(3) Represent a client in a matter and at the same time in a separate
matter accept as client a person or entity whose interest in the first
matter is adverse to the client in the first matter.
(D) A member who represents two or more clients shall not enter into
an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients without
the informed written consent of each client.
(E) A member shall not, without the informed written consent of the
client or former client, accept employment adverse to the client or for-
mer client where, by reason of the representation of the client or former
client, the member has obtained confidential information material to
the employment.
(F) A member shall not accept compensation for representing a client
from one other than the client unless:
(1) There is no interference with the member's independence of profes-
sional judgment or the client-lawyer relationship; and
(2) Information relating to representation of the client is protected as
required by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision
(e); and
(3) The member obtains the client's informed written consent, provided
that no disclosure or consent is required if;
(a) such nondisclosure is otherwise authorized by law, or
(b) the member is rendering legal services on behalf of any public
agency which provides legal services to other public agencies or the
public.
CAL. RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-310 (2002).
73. See Formal Op. 2003-161, supra note 66, at 5.
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conduct in light of the totality of the circumstances.4 To de-
termine if an implied agreement exists, the courts look to a
number of factors, none of which is necessarily dispositive. 75
In regard to Lawyer's conduct, the relevant factors in-
clude whether Lawyer (1) volunteered services to a prospec-
tive client; (2) agreed to investigate a case and give legal ad-
vice about its merits; (3) previously represented the client,
particularly over a lengthy period of time or in several mat-
ters, or without an express agreement, or in circumstances
similar to those at hand; and (4) provided advice about the
matter in question, and the individual sought advice. 6
In regard to each of the three speakers, the relevant fac-
tors include whether he (1) paid fees to Lawyer or gave other
consideration in regard to the matter in question; (2) con-
sulted Lawyer in confidence; and (3) reasonably believed he
was consulting Lawyer in a professional capacity.
77
The last factor is among the most important: the consult-
ing individual's expectation, based on how the situation
would appear to a reasonable person in the same position, is
highly relevant to finding an implied-in-fact attorney-client
relationship.78 However, this expectation must be reasonably
induced by the attorney's representations or conduct. 9
In the three hypothetical situations, none of the above
factors is present.' ° Thus, none of the speakers "could have
held a reasonable belief that Lawyer would either protect his
or her interests or provide legal services."81 No implied-in-fact
attorney-client relationship was formed.82
b. Whether Lawyer Manifested a Willingness to
Engage In Preliminary Consultation and the
Communication Was Confidential
Although the lack of an attorney-client relationship ex-
74. See id.
75. See id. For further discussion of this subject, see infra Part III.D.2.
76. See Formal Op. 2003-161, supra note 66.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 4; see also Part III.A.2.b.(2) infra (discussing, in the last para-
graph, the possibility that Cousin considered the phone call confidential, which
is the second factor applicable to the speakers).
82. See Formal Op. 2003-161, supra note 66, at 4.
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tinguishes many potential duties, the duty of confidentiality
may still apply. 3 The question then is whether an attorney
has manifested a willingness to engage in a confidential
communication.' This question leads in turn to two further
questions, to be addressed with regard to the totality of the
circumstances: (1) whether an individual is a "client" within
the meaning of Evidence Code section 951;8 and (2) whether
the communication was confidential.86
1. The Individual Must Be a "Client"
In a previous opinion,87 the Committee explained that the
same basic policy underlies both the evidentiary attorney-
client privilege and the duty of confidentiality: "[T]o encour-
age clients to disclose all possibly pertinent information to
their attorneys so that the attorneys may effectively repre-
sent the clients' interests.""8 For the purposes of the eviden-
tiary privilege, and thus of the duty of confidentiality, a per-
son is a "client" if a lawyer's conduct "manifests a willingness,
express or implied, to consult with the person in the lawyer's
professional capacity."
89
The critical factor, therefore, is the attorney's conduct. 90
Unless the attorney's prior conduct or words have created a
reasonable expectation that she has agreed to a consultation,
she will owe no duty of confidentiality provided that she un-
equivocally informs the speaker that she will not represent
him." She must do so, however, as soon as reasonably possi-
ble after it becomes reasonably apparent that the speaker
wishes to consult with her..
Absent this unequivocal refusal, the individual may have
a reasonable belief that he is consulting the attorney in a pro-
fessional capacity. 93 Factors to consider in evaluating the rea-
83. See id. at 5
84. See id.
85. See id
86. See id.; see also supra note 72 and accompanying text.
87. See Formal Op. 1984-84, supra note 71, at 5.
88. Id.
89. Id.; see also discussion supra note 72 and accompanying text.
90. See Formal Op. 2003-161, supra note 66, at 6 (citing People v. Gionis,
892 P.2d 1199 (Cal. 1995) and Formal Op. 1984-84, supra note 72).
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
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sonableness of this belief include whether the attorney has a
reasonable opportunity to "interpose a disclaimer before the
person begins to speak" or to "comprehend that a person is
trying to engage in a consultation"; or whether the speaker's
manner "prevents the lawyer reasonably from interposing
any disclaimer or ending the conversation. " 94
Thus, in "Situation 1" above, if Jones blurted out his con-
fession before Lawyer could speak, there would be no basis for
finding Lawyer's willingness to consult.95  By contrast, if
Jones spoke in a low voice and began drawing Lawyer into a
private area of the courthouse, Lawyer might manifest will-
ingness by accompanying Jones without objection." If Law-
yer moreover began discussing Jones' situation, there would
be a strong suggestion of consent to consult.97
In "Situation 2," the relevant factors are Lawyer's lack of
opportunity to comprehend that Smith intended to consult
with her, her immediate disclaimer, and the conversation's
context within the non-professional social setting of a party.98
However, had Lawyer been introduced as a specialist in in-
surance law who "should be able to help you with your prob-
lem," and had Lawyer then listened politely to Smith's recita-
tion of facts, Smith might have had a reasonable basis to
believe he was consulting Lawyer in her professional capac-
ity. Given the nature of the introduction, Lawyer's failure to
interpose an immediate disclaimer could render the incon-
gruous context (the non-professional social situation) less sig-
nificant.100
In "Situation 3," Lawyer's familial relationship with
Cousin would weigh against Lawyer's ability to recognize a
home phone call as a potential consultation.' However, if
Cousin's rapidity of speech did not prevent it, Lawyer should
have said something to avoid creating the inference that she
did not object to the consultation. 2
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. See Formal Op. 2003-161, supra note 66, at 6.
97. See id. at 7.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See Formal Op. 2003-161, supra note 66, at 7.
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2. The Communication Must Be Confidential
In pertinent part, California Evidence Code section 952
defines "confidential communication" as "information trans-
mitted.., in confidence by a means which, so far as the client
is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other
than those who are present to further the interest of the cli-
ent in the consultation ...""'
Various circumstances can affect a communication's po-
tential confidentiality.14 As the Evidence Code indicates, if
other individuals are present and able to overhear the com-
munication, there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy
unless the other individuals are there to further the speaker's
interests.'' Also, confidentiality may depend on both the ex-
tent to which the information is known publicly, as well as its
"inherent sensitivity" to the speaker.0 6 A well-known but
highly embarrassing fact is unlikely to be communicated with
the expectation of privacy; by contrast, a little-known matter
of public record, such as a long-past felony conviction, might
be considered confidential.'07
On the other hand, given the opportunity, a burden is
placed on an unwillingly consulted attorney to avoid creating
an expectation of privacy.'08 Thus an additional factor in ana-
lyzing the attorney's obligation of confidentiality is the attor-
ney's effort to communicate that the conversation is not ap-
propriate or confidential. 9 The speaker's motivation for
communicating is another factor, in that a communication in-
tended to lead to legal representation or advice might be con-
sidered to have been confidential. 10
Thus, in "Situation 1" above, if Jones blurted out his con-
fession in a populated area, he would have no reasonable ba-
sis to believe the communication was confidential."' If in-
stead he drew Lawyer into a relatively isolated area and
spoke in a low voice, Lawyer may have seemed to acquiesce to
103. CAL. EVID. CODE § 952 (West 2003); see discussion supra note 72.
104. See Formal Op. 2003-161, supra note 66, at 8.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See Formal Op. 2003-161, supra note 66, at 8
111. See id,
1324 Vol: 44
ETHICS YEAR IN RE VIEW
a confidential communication." '
In "Situation 2," even had Smith spoken quietly in an
unpopulated area of the party, the information conveyed (i.e.,
an office's roof was badly leaking) was likely to have been
widely known; moreover, it was not of a sensitive nature."'
No duty would arise."4 But had the information, imparted
privately, been known only to Smith, and been relevant to an
insurer's defense against the claim, the communication might
be found to be confidential."5
"Situation 3," involving a private telephone conversation,
presents a closer question."6 Even so, the fact that Cousin
had damaged the car may have already been publicly
known." ' In quickly suggesting that Cousin seek other repre-
sentation, Lawyer would then owe no duty of confidential-
ity. 
18
3. Conclusion of Formal Opinion 2003-161
Hypothetical
In the context of an informal request for legal informa-
tion, if the querent could have held a reasonable belief that
the attorney would protect his interests or provide legal ser-
vices, an implied-in-fact attorney-client relationship may
arise. But even absent such a relationship, if an attorney is
asked whether she is an attorney, or if the speaker speaks
quietly, draws the attorney aside, or otherwise indicates that
the conversation is private, the "focus shifts to the attorney to
see whether the attorney affirmatively encouraged or permit-
ted the speaker to continue talking. If so the communication
will likely be found confidential."1 9
112. See id.
113. See id. at 9.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See Formal Op. 2003-161, supra note 66, at 9.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
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B. Professional Responsibility and the Politically Active
Attorney: Formal Opinion 2003_162
°
Attorneys sometimes engage in political and social activ-
ism. In some circumstances an attorney's activism or adher-
ence to a particular philosophy may raise professional re-
sponsibility issues related to her duties to clients. These
issues may arise, for example, in regard to giving advice, dis-
closing conflicts of interest, and providing competent repre-
sentation. 2'
In Formal Opinion 2003-162, the Committee considered
the situation of practicing attorneys who publicly advocate
civil disobedience. 2 2 The Committee concluded that attorneys
must be aware of the possibility that their beliefs or exercise
of First Amendment rights may adversely affect the perform-
ance of their duties to clients.2 3 To minimize this risk, attor-
neys should exercise care in their selection of clients, practice
areas, and types of cases. 4
1. Hypothetical Facts"5
Attorney is a member of an Association opposed to taxa-
tion of individuals and family businesses. In speeches deliv-
ered at Association conferences, Attorney has advocated that
individuals and small businesses should neither pay taxes
nor make reports to federal agencies that might lead to the
imposition of taxation.
Attorney's practice directly and indirectly emphasizes tax
consultation. Her activities with Association have resulted in
a substantial number of client referrals. Regardless, she ad-
vises her clients to behave lawfully.
2. Discussion
Attorney's activism in this hypothetical is legal.'26 No law
may forbid or proscribe the advocacy of illegal behavior except
120. State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Profl Responsibility & Conduct,
Formal Op. 2003-162 (2003) [hereinafter Formal Op. 2003-162], at
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/ethics/OPN-2003_162.pdf.
121. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
122. Formal Op. 2003-162, supra note 120.
123. See id. at 1.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
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where "such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing im-
minent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action."127 Attorney's First Amendment rights in this regard
are not limited by virtue of her profession. 2 ' However, if At-
torney actually engages in illegal conduct, she is subject to
discipline even if "the conduct occurs outside the practice of
law and does not involve moral turpitude.' 29
Of course, activism and advising are different behaviors:
one involves the exercise of First Amendment rights; the
other implicates a duty to clients. 3 ° Attorney's duty to her
clients mandates that she not advise them to violate the law,
absent (1) a reasonable, good-faith belief that a given law is
invalid, and (2) a good-faith argument for that law's modifica-
tion or reversal.
1
3'
Other issues may arise regardless of the advice given by
Attorney. To avoid potential or actual conflicts of interest,
Attorney may have a duty to provide her clients with a writ-
ten disclosure of her membership in Association.3 2 Rule 3-
310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct imposes
this duty when a lawyer has or had a legal, business, finan-
cial, professional, or personal interest in-or similar relation-
ship with a party or witness in-the subject matter of her
representation of a client.13' Here, however, neither situation
pertains to Attorney: Association is neither a party nor wit-
ness to, nor the subject matter of, Attorney's representation of
her tax clients.
3
1
However, Rule 3-310 also applies when an attorney
knows (or reasonably should know) that another person or
entity would be substantially affected by resolution of the cli-
ent's matter, and the attorney has or had a legal, business,
financial, professional, or personal relationship with the per-
son or entity. 13  Conceivably, the scope and object of the cli-
ent's engagement of Attorney, or other circumstances, might
127. See id. (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
128. See Formal Op. 2003-162, supra note 120, at 2.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 2 n.1 (citing CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-210, 3-200;
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(a),(c)) (West 2004).
132. See id.; supra note 72.
133. See Formal Op. 2003-162, supra note 120, at 2; discussion supra note 72.
134. See Formal Op. 2003-162, supra note 120, at 3.
135. See id.; discussion supra note 72.
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lead to a resolution that would substantially affect Associa-
tion.'36 If so, this potential conflict of interest may generate
the duty to disclose.'37
Finally, Attorney's advocacy of illegal behavior may affect
her competency to represent clients in business and taxation
matters.'38 Rule 3-110 prohibits intentional, reckless, or re-
peated incompetence.'39 Although the Rule's definition of
"competence" includes the components of diligence, learning,
and skill-all likely to be enhanced by Attorney's strong in-
terest in tax matters 14° -the definition also extends to the
"mental, emotional and physical ability reasonably necessary
for the performance of such services.""" In its effect on her
ability to objectively evaluate legal positions, provide unbi-
ased advice, and adhere to her clients' directions, Attorney's
mental or emotional state in regard to the subject of taxation
may lead to violation of the duty of competence.1
3. Conclusion ofFormal Opinion 2003-162 Hypothetical
In itself, an attorney's political or social activism might
create no ethical difficulties.13  However, an attorney is sub-
ject to discipline for engaging in illegal behavior or (except in
limited circumstances) advising her clients to behave ille-
gally.'" Her association with an advocacy group may create a
conflict of interest-and thus a duty to disclose her associa-
tion-if the group might be substantially affected by the reso-
lution of her client's legal matters. 14' Finally, if her activism
affects her mental and emotional state in regard to certain is-
sues raised by clients, she risks violating her duty of compe-
136. See Formal Op. 2003-162, supra note 120, at 3.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. In pertinent part, Rule 3-110 states:
(A) A member shall not intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly fail to
perform legal services with competence.
(B) For purposes of this rule, "competence" in any legal service shall
mean to apply the 1) diligence, 2) learning and skill, and 3) mental,
emotional, and physical ability reasonably necessary for the perform-
ance of such service.
CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-110 (2003).
140. See Formal Op. 2003-162, supra note 120, at 3.
141. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-110, quoted supra note 139.
142. See Formal Op. 2003-162, supra note 120, at 3.
143. See id.
144. See id.; supra note 131 and accompanying text.
145. See Formal Op. 2003-162, supra note 120, at 2 n.1.
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tence. 146
C. Outside Corporate Counsel Who Separately Represent
Corporate Constituents: Formal Opinion 2003-16g
47
Outside corporate counsel sometimes have attorney-
client relationships with corporate constituents. The Com-
mittee considered both the possibility of conflicts of interest in
such situations, as well as the appropriate response to these
conflicts under two representative fact patterns.' s
1. Hypothetical FactS?
49
Lawyer has separate, on-going professional relationships
with both Corp, a closely-held corporation, and Corp's Chief
Financial Officer (CFO). Lawyer's work for CFO involves
only personal matters unrelated to Corp; she has never repre-
sented CFO and Corp as joint clients. However, neither has
Lawyer excluded from either relationship any matters relat-
ing to CFO's employment, nor does she have any written en-
gagement agreement with either party.
It develops that CFO might have sexually harassed Corp
employees. For the purposes of this dual hypothetical, Law-
yer learns of this possibility in one of two ways: (1) CFO ad-
mits to sexual harassment after Lawyer agrees to speak with
him in private about a "personal matter"; or (2) Corp's Presi-
dent tells Lawyer of both particular and rumored incidents of
sexual harassment by CFO, and requests advice regarding
Corp's response.
2. Discussion
a. Lawyer's Duty Where CFO Provides Information
If CFO had the objectively reasonable belief that he was
speaking to Lawyer as CFO's personal lawyer, the informa-
tion is confidential."' Whether or not CFO was attempting to
146. See id.
147. State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Profl Responsibility & Conduct,
Formal Op. No. 2003-163 (2003) [hereinafter Formal Op. 2003-163], at
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/ethics/2003-163%20(95-0005).pdf.
148. See id. at 1
149. See id.
150. See id. at 2 (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 2003));
discussion supra note 72.
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obtain legal advice, he communicated a client secret.' Client
secrets include information whose disclosure would be embar-
rassing or likely detrimental to the client. 5 '
Even if Lawyer had not intended to provide legal advice,
her relationship with CFO might have given CFO a reason-
able basis for believing that he was speaking to Lawyer in her
professional capacity and in confidence.15 Conversely, if the
course of dealing between the two would preclude CFO from
believing reasonably that his conversation with Lawyer was
an attorney-client consultation, no duty of confidentiality
would arise."'
Given that a duty of confidentiality has arisen, however,
Lawyer may not reveal any information about CFO's harass-
ment learned as the result of her representation of CFO."' In
turn, this prohibition could impede her ability to discharge
her duties to Corp: CFO's alleged harassment could result in
liability to Corp, and ordinarily Lawyer's duty of competent
representation would include alerting Corp to, and advising
Corp about, potential liabilities."6 Unless CFO were to con-
sent to disclosure of the confidential information, Lawyer's
duty to CFO would conflict with her duty to Corp, at least
with regard to matters "encompassing CFO's harassment.
157
Lawyer has a duty to inform Corp of significant develop-
ments related to her representation of Corp."8 Moreover,
Lawyer must withdraw from representing Corp to the extent
that CFO's confidential information is pertinent to such rep-
resentation."9
Lawyer may be able to limit her withdrawal if a limited
withdrawal will not "imperil" CFO's confidentiality.' How-
151. See Formal Op. 2003-163, supra note 147, at 2 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 952 (West 2003)); discussion supra note 72.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id (citing CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-110(A), (B) (2003));
discussion supra note 139.
157. See Formal Op. 2003-163, supra note 147, at 3 (citing State Bar of Cal.
Standing Comm. On Prof 1 Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 1995-141
(1995)).
158. See id. (citing CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-500; CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 6068(m) (West 2003)).
159. See id. (citing CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-700(B)(2)).
160. See id.
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ever,'the terms of such a withdrawal might implicitly disclose
confidential information about CFO.' If so, lawyer should
withdraw completely.'62 In either case, Lawyer should take
"reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice"
to Corp's legal rights.
163
b. Lawyer's Duty Where the Hypothetical
Corporation's President Provides Information
In this circumstance, the information about CFO's sexual
harassment does not constitute CFO's client secret: the in-
formation was learned "as a result of Lawyer's representation
of Corp, not CFO."' Nevertheless, Lawyer may owe a duty of
loyalty to CFO.'65 An attorney's duty of loyalty "to protect his
client in every possible way" forbids him from "assum[ing] a
position adverse or antagonistic to his client without the lat-
ter's free and intelligent consent. ,,66 Any advice to Corp
regarding Corp's reaction to the harassment allegations
would be adverse to CFO, who might face negative conse-
quences both professionally and legally.'
67
Lawyer may not simply drop CFO as a client; however,
she may be able to ask CFO to waive the duty of loyalty.' 61 If
a duty of confidentiality to Corp applies, though, the request
for waiver might necessitate Corp's consent to reveal to CFO
the fact that Lawyer has been informed of the allegations.'66
If Lawyer cannot obtain CFO's waiver of the duty of loy-
alty, Lawyer faces a conflict between this duty and her duty
to represent Corp competently.'7  She must withdraw from
representing Corp to the extent necessary to resolve the con-
flict.' This would include withdrawing from representation
whose responsibilities include "identifying and assessing po-
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See Formal Op. 2003-163, supra note 147, at 3 (citing CAL. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-700(A)(2)).
164. Id.
165. See id.
166. Id. (quoting Santa Clara County Counsel Attys. Ass'n v. Woodside, 869
P.2d 1142, 1155 (Cal. 1994)).
167. See id.
168. See id. (citing Flatt v. Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950 (Cal. 1994); Truck
Ins. Exch. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228, 231 (1992))
169. See Formal Op. 2003-163, supra note 147, at 3.
170. See id.
171. Seeid.
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tential claims against Corp arising from CFO's conduct."7 '
If, conversely, Lawyer does obtain CFO's waiver, several
other issues arise.' 3 Lawyer's advice to Corp must be given
without regard to her relationship with CFO; that is, she
should not attempt to counsel Corp about CFO unless she can
base her advice on independent and objective professional
judgment.7 4 Lawyer is also likely to be obliged to disclose to
Corp, in writing, the fact of her professional relationship with
CFO.' Rule 3-310 requires such disclosure (in this case) for
two reasons, either of which would be sufficient for the re-
quirement to apply: first, CFO is a party to the matter in
which Lawyer will advise Corp; and second, CFO is likely to
be substantially affected by the outcome of the matter.176
3. Conclusion of Formal Opinion 2003-163 Hypothetical
Usually, outside corporate counsel can provide personal
legal services to corporate constituents without conflict or vio-
lation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.177 Attorneys who
engage in such practices should be alert to the possibility of
potential conflicts of interest as they arise.'78 Even absent a
duty of confidentiality to the corporation or the corporate con-
stituent, the duty of loyalty to one party may occasionally
prevent an attorney from competently representing the other
party."' Carefully crafted withdrawal from part of the repre-
sentation, or complete withdrawal from all representation,
may be necessary to the extent that the interests of the two
types of clients are in direct conflict.8 '
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See Formal Op. 2003-163, supra note 147, at 4 (citing CAL. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-310(B)); discussion supra note 72.
176. See Formal Op. 2003-163, supra note 147, at 4 (citing CAL. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-310(B)(1), (3)); discussion supra note 72.
177. See Formal Op. 2003-163, supra note 147, at 4.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 3-4.
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D. Professional Duties ofAttorneys Who Provide
Information to the Public at Large: Formal Opinion 2003-
164'8s'
Partly as the result of the lack of general access to af-
fordable legal services,182 various media formats facilitate in-
teraction between attorneys and the public at large. For ex-
ample, radio call-in programs, newspaper and magazine
columns, and interactive Internet sites may provide fora for
members of the public to request specific information from at-
torneys about legal rights and responsibilities. In such cir-
cumstances, it may be unclear whether an attorney-client
relationship arises, or whether other professional duties may
be implicated.'83
1. Hypothetical Factd&'
As an uncompensated public service, Attorney partici-
pates in a radio call-in show. Listeners and callers are re-
peatedly advised that the on-air conversations are not confi-
dential, and that the radio show is not intended to be a
substitute for personal consultation with an attorney. Mean-
while, callers often give personal information to the radio sta-
tion's non-attorney "screeners" before being put on the air, re-
gardless of having been asked not to do so.
During the show, one caller asks about a landlord-tenant
matter. Attorney gives a generalized answer, avoiding the
specifics of the caller's questions. Attorney then explains that
the question is outside her area of expertise, and advises the
caller to consult an attorney whose practice deals with land-
lord-tenant issues.
Another caller asks about a probate matter. Except in
regard to the legal specifics of her answer, Attorney responds
just as she had to the landlord-tenant question. However, the
generalized answer she gives is incorrect and misstates the
law.
181. State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Profl Responsibility & Conduct,
Formal Op. 2003-164 (2003) [hereinafter Formal Op. 2003-164], at
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/ethics/2003-164%20(960013).pdf.
182. See id. at 2.
183. See infra Part III.D.2.
184. See Formal Op. 2003-164, supra note 181, at 1.
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2. Discussion
Attorney has not agreed explicitly to form an attorney-
client relationship with the callers. 185 However, an attorney-
client relationship may also be formed by implied agreement
(thus entailing responsibilities to the client such as confiden-
tiality, loyalty, and competency).' To determine if an im-
plied-in-fact agreement exists, the courts consider the totality
of the circumstances by looking to a number of factors." 7 No
one factor is necessarily dispositive"'8
In regard to the attorney's behavior, the relevant factors
include whether the attorney (1) volunteered services to a
prospective client; (2) agreed to investigate a case and give le-
gal advice about its merits; (3) previously represented the cli-
ent, particularly over a lengthy period of time or in several
matters, or without an express agreement, or in circum-
stances similar to those at hand; and (4) provided advice
about the matter in question, and the individual sought ad-
vice. 89
In regard to the potential client, the relevant factors in-
clude whether the individual (1). paid the attorney fees or
gave other consideration in regard to the matter in question;
(2) consulted the attorney in confidence; and (3) reasonably
believed he or she was consulting the attorney in a profes-
sional capacity. 90
Here, Attorney invited the callers to ask questions calling
for legal knowledge, and voluntarily agreed to provide an-
swers. 191 The questions involved the callers' personal legal
problems, and the callers gave personal information to the
screeners despite being asked not to do so.'92 These factors
might suggest the existence of an implied-in-fact agreement
185. See id.
186. See id. at 2 (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 2003) and
CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-110, 3-300, 3-310 (2003)); see also discus-
sion supra notes 72, 139. For further discussion of this subject, see supra Part
III.A.2.a.
187. See Formal Op. 2003-164, supra note 181, at 3 (citing Formal Op. 2003-
161).
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 4.
192. See id.
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to form an attorney-client relationship. 19
However, it was not reasonable for the callers to have be-
lieved that calling a radio show (as opposed, for example, to
calling or visiting an attorney's office) is an acceptable man-
ner of seeking legal advice.14 Further, the public nature of
the broadcasts, as well as the frequent warnings that the con-
sultations were not confidential, made it impossible for the
callers to reasonably expect confidentiality, which is ordinar-
ily an essential aspect of an attorney-client relationship. 99
The callers were also reminded that the show's format was
not meant to be a substitute for personally hiring an attorney,
and were advised to seek out an attorney more knowledgeable
in the matters of concern 9  Finally, the answers provided
were meant to be generally applicable to the public, rather
than specifically tailored to each caller, and neither the call-
ers nor anyone else paid Attorney for her advice.9 7
In the totality of the circumstances, therefore, "there is
no reasonable basis for callers to believe Attorney is under-
taking to represent the caller's specific interests."199
Nevertheless, in such circumstances attorneys should
avoid answering questions about areas of law with which they
are unfamiliar, or giving information about which they lack
confidence.'99 The goal of increasing public access to legal in-
formation is not furthered by the dissemination of incorrect
information.0 °
3. Conclusion of Formal Opinion 2003-164 Hypothetical
Particularly given the public, non-confidential nature of
formats such as those described above, no implied attorney-
client relationship is likely to arise as the result of providing
general legal information to the public at large.201 However,
attorneys should be mindful of the limitations of such for-
mats, particularly when addressing complex topics or matters
193. See Formal Op. 2003-164, supra note 181, at 4.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 5 (citing CAL. EVID. Code §§ 951, 952 (West 2003)); discussion
supra note 72.
196. See Formal Op. 2003-164, supra note 181, at 4.
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 5.
200. See id.
201. See generally id.
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outside their area of expertise.0 2
IV. AMENDMENTS TO THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: REVISED RULES
1.6 AND 1.13
A. Background: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley, and the SEC
Public outrage following the collapse of scandal-ridden
Enron Corporation led Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002.202 Among other things, the Act created "a number
of new requirements for public companies, their boards of di-
rectors, and their auditors."0 4
In particular, section 307 of the Act (a directive to the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission) prompted the SEC to
adopt 17 C.F.R. § 205, which alters the responsibilities of at-
torneys who appear and practice before the SEC in the repre-
sentation of "issuers" (i.e., public companies). 25  Under the
new SEC regulation, if such an attorney finds evidence of cer-
tain violations committed by agents of a public company, she
must report her findings "up-the-ladder" to one of the com-
pany's highest officers.2 6 Absent an appropriate response, the
attorney must then report the evidence to the board of direc-
tors or an independent committee within it, or to an audit
committee.0 7
Under many circumstances, however, such reports might
arguably constitute a breach of the duty of confidentiality to
one or more clients.0 8 In response to the potential conflict be-
tween the new SEC regulation and various states' confidenti-
ality rules, in August 2003 the ABA approved two amend-
ments to its Model Rules of Professional Conduct.2 '
202. See Formal Op. 2003-164, supra note 181, at 6.
203. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Future of
the Mandatory Disclosure System: Foreward, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 231 (2003).
204. See, e.g., Thomas E. Spahn, Sarbanes-Oxley, The ABA Model Rules and
State "Whistleblowing" Duties: The Untold Story (Sept. 2, 2003), at
http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/news/item.asp?item=598.
205. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); 17 C.F.R. § 205
(2003).
206. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.
207. See id.
208. See supra Part III.C (discussing conflicts of interest arising for corporate
counsel who also may have duties to corporate constituents).
209. See A.B.A. Press Release, ABA Adopts New Lawyer Ethics Rules, Urges
Fairness in Military Commission Trials (Aug. 12, 2003), at
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B. Revised Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information Relating
to Client Crime or Fraud
ABA Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 is titled "Confiden-
tiality of Information."1 ' The rule "governs the disclosure by
a lawyer of information relating to representation of a client
during the lawyer's representation of the client."21'
Revised Rule 1.6 permits an attorney "to reveal informa-
tion relating to the representation of a client" if (a) the attor-
ney believes disclosure is necessary to "prevent, mitigate, or
rectify" substantial economic harm to another; (b) the harm
results or will result from the client's crime or fraud; and (c)
the crime or fraud was committed through the use of the at-
torney's services."'
C. Revised Rule 1.13: Internal Reports and
"Whistleblo wing"
ABA Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13 is titled "Organi-
zation as Client."213 In essence, the rule highlights the dis-
tinction between an organization (as a client) and the con-
stituents of the organization (as agents of the client).214 Prior
to the latest amendments, the rule mandated-as it does
now-that an attorney respond to discovery of wrongdoing; 1.
however, it provided only an unexclusive and discretionary
list of appropriate responses, weakening its proscriptive force
on attorneys.1 6
Revised Rule 1.13 no longer allows for discretion.217 In-
stead, it requires an attorney to report "to higher authority in
the organization" any evidence of wrongdoing by an employee
likely to result in substantial harm to the client (i.e., the or-
ganization).2 8 If this internal reporting fails to produce re-
sults necessary to prevent harm to the client, the attorney is
http://www.ahrc.com/new/contents/media/uploads/187ABAEthics.html.
210. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003).
211. Id.
212. See id.
213. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003).
214. See generally Spahn, supra note 2.
215. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003).
216. Id. A redline version of the amended rule is available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/red-rulel13.pdf.
217. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13.
218. See id.
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permitted to reveal the information to outside persons.219 In
other words, the amended rule permits "whistleblowing" in
the absence of meaningful action by internal authorities.22 °
D. Response of the California Legislature: A Much Narrower
Revision of the Duty of Confidentiality
As mandated by section 6068(e)(1) of the California State
Bar Act, an attorney has the duty to "maintain inviolate the
confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself, to pre-
serve the secrets, of his or her client."2 1 In October 2003, two
months after the ABA amended its confidentiality rules, the
California legislature added section 6068(e)(2) to the State
Bar Act:
222
Notwithstanding paragraph (1), an attorney may, but is
not required to, reveal confidential information relating to
the representation of a client to the extent that the attor-
ney reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to pre-
vent a criminal act that the attorney reasonably believes
is likely to result in death of, or substantial bodily injury
to, an individual.223
Obviously, this is much narrower than the ABA's revi-
sions, pertaining to the prevention of death or bodily injury
rather than economic harm.
V. CONCLUSION
In an era marked by increased specialization among at-
224torneys,  the one area of law no practitioner can afford to ig-
nore is "the law governing lawyers." Although the changes
occurring in 2003 were less sweeping than in the immediately
225preceding years, they are crucial to an attorney who might
cross state lines to assist a client, or practice in a state requir-
ing corporate counsel to prevent or mitigate economic harms
irrespective of the duty of confidentiality. Meanwhile, the
219. See id.
220. See generallySpahn, supra note 2.
221. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e)(1) (West 2003).
222. See 2003 Cal. Legis. Serv. 765, § 1, A.B. no. 1101.
223. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e)(2).
224. See, e.g., LYNN MATHER ET AL., DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK: VARIETIES
OF PROFESSIONALISM IN PRACTICE 182 (2001).
225. See, e.g., Heather Owen, Note, Ethics Year in Review, 43 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 1501, 1529-34 (2003) (describing extensive revision in 2002 of the ABA's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
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four new advisory opinions issued by the Standing Committee
on Professional Responsibility and Conduct shed additional
light not only on the complexities of confidentiality require-
ments in the corporate environment, but also on issues as
universal as responding to informal requests for legal advice,
and as specific as the duties of attorneys who provide infor-
mation to the public at large or engage in political activism.
No citizen, much less an attorney, can fall back on the non-
excuse of ignorance of the law. Both practically and ethically,
the solution for attorneys is never to ignore the newest "laws
of lawyering" in the first place.

